This paper investigates whether and how strongly the share of homeowners in a community affects residential property taxation by local governments. Different from renters, homeowners bear the full property tax burden irrespective of local market conditions, and the tax is more salient to them. "Homeowner communities" may hence oppose high property taxes in order to protect their housing wealth. Using granular spatial data from a complete housing inventory in the 2011 German Census and historical war damages as a source of exogenous variation in local homeownership, we provide empirical evidence that otherwise identical jurisdictions charge significantly lower property taxes when the share of homeowners in their population is higher. This result is invariant to local market conditions, which suggests tax salience as the key mechanism behind this effect. We find positive spatial dependence in tax multipliers, indicative of property tax mimicking by local governments.
Introduction
In many countries, taxing housing wealth forms an important source of fiscal revenue for local governments. 1 Due to the immobility of the tax base, residential property taxes are also generally considered to score high from a tax efficiency perspective (Wilson, 2006) .
Their actual efficiency, however, hinges critically upon the political economy of property taxation, which is concerned with the decisions of whom, how and how much to tax.
Property taxes are levied on both owner-occupiers and renters, but the perception and true economic burden differ substantially between these two groups. 2 According to the "home voter hypothesis" first coined by Fischel (2001) , especially households who own their homes are expected to oppose high local property taxes. Homeowners have strong incentives to promote high market values for the typically biggest item in their wealth portfolios. Recent research suggests that the unpopularity of property taxes among homeowners also results from higher salience: in many countries, the property tax tends to be much more visible for homeowners than for renters. 3 Renters sometimes even underlie the illusion of not paying property taxes at all (Oates, 2005) .
If homeowners oppose property taxes more strongly than renters, "homeowner communities" -i.e., jurisdictions with large shares of households owning their homes -are expected to tax property less heavily than governments of otherwise comparable communities. This paper makes use of a previously untapped and highly detailed data set to empirically investigate this hypothesis. The backbone of this data set is a complete inventory of residential real estate compiled in the 2011 German Census. For each indi-1 Total revenue of the Type B German Property Tax (levied on non-agricultural property, including improvements to land) amounted to 13.26 billion euros in 2016, according to Federal Statistical Office. This corresponds to 323 euros per dwelling and about one-sixth of total municipal tax revenue. The relative importance of property taxes is even larger in Anglo-Saxon and also many other OECD countries, see Norregaard (2013) for in-depth discussion. 2 Landlords are often statutorily allowed to shift the property tax to their tenants on a pro rata basis. Local market conditions may however preclude that property taxes are fully shifted forward onto renters in many locations in economic terms. 3 German homeowners annually receive a discrete property tax bill from their municipality. For renters, the tax usually appears among many other cost positions in the annual utilities statement, which comes from their landlords. Other positions include insurance, waste collection, housekeeping etc. vidual housing unit, the inventory collected information about the type of owner and the current state of use. We aggregate this data to the level of municipalities, which typically rank between U.S. Census Tracts and Census Block Groups in terms of population size.
We merge this data with local property tax multipliers and rich information from local property tax statistics, fiscal accounts, income tax statistics, labor statistics and federal elections. Our final data set covers a cross-section of 8,036 Western German municipalities 4 and contains information on local fiscal conditions, socioeconomic characteristics, economic prosperity and political tastes.
One key contribution of our paper is a clear identification of causality running from local homeownership rates to property tax multipliers. To this end, our empirical analysis exploits two unique institutional circumstances of the German housing market. We first make use of the missing link between the size of the local property tax base and actual housing market values in the special design of the German property tax. This special design guarantees that choosing the local multiplier is the only way by which local governments can influence their property tax revenue. Second, we exploit historical information on housing damages during the Second World War. Such damages led to large-scale provision of rental housing in areas affected by warfare, having long-lasting effects on homeownership independent from local public financing. This natural experiment provides exogenous variation that we use for causal inference about the homeowner effect. 5
Based on spatial autoregressive models, we simultaneously account for the possibility of strategic interdependence among municipalities' property tax choices.
In comparison to the rich literature on strategic spatial interaction in local property taxation, the role of property rights in driving property taxes has been subject to a very limited number of studies. Existing attempts (see, e.g., Roche, 1986; Oates, 2005; Brunner, Ross, and Simonsen, 2015) have been plagued by issues of identification and statistical control. We contribute to this strand of literature by asking whether and how strongly the local rate of homeownership causally affects property taxation across a very large sample of local jurisdictions. By providing further evidence supportive of spatial dependence in local property tax multipliers, our study also contributes to the spatial interaction literature in property tax setting (see, e.g., Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Allers and Elhorst, 2005; Lyytikäinen, 2012) .
We approach the question of a homeowner effect in the presence of spatial interaction in property tax rates among jurisdictions along two dimensions. We first develop a yardstick competition model of local property taxation, which serves as basis for the formulation of three key research hypotheses. We subsequently test these hypotheses in an integrated spatial econometric framework that links local property tax multipliers to local proportions of owner-occupied housing and neighboring localities' multipliers. We use an extensive set of possibly confounding variables in order to control for local fiscal conditions, socioeconomic structure and political colouring. Our identification strategy explicitly tackles the endogeneity problem among local property tax and homeowner share in a spatial instrumental variable setting.
Our results suggest that local governments indeed tax homeowner communities differently compared to otherwise comparable communities. Depending on the exact specification, a hypothetical rise in a local jurisdiction's homeownership rate by ten percentage points decreases the local property tax multiplier by an average direct effect of 2-3 points.
This key result remains unchanged when spatial dependence in tax multipliers and endogeneity among homeownership and property taxes is accounted for. Calculating the average total effect of a hypothetical change in homeownership, we estimate that local tax multipliers would be on average 6-7 points lower in the case of a global rise in homeownership of ten percentage points across all jurisdictions in the sample. Such a reduction in local multipliers would correspond to an annual tax loss of 120-140 million euros, or one percent of total property tax revenue.
3 An interesting implication of our finding is that actual levels of residential property taxation may not be efficient from a social welfare perspective. If homeowners successfully manage to oppose high property taxes relative to other sources of fiscal revenue, property taxation will tend to be too low in high-homeownership communities, while other local taxes and fees will tend to be too high. The latter effect could unfold adverse repercussions on the access to local public and quasi-public goods. Our results finally have practical implications for local policy makers in providing a possibility to judge their actual tax multiplier choices against an empirical benchmark.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the current state of research concerning the political economy of property taxation and spatial property tax dependence, including a discussion of the key concepts of home-voting, tax illusion and tax mimicking. Section 3 links this review to a yardstick competition model of local property taxation, which serves to derive the key hypotheses we test. Section 4 introduces the data set and discusses our identification strategy. Section 5 presents the empirical results, while Section 6 concludes.
2 Home-Voting, Renting and Spatial Property Tax
Interaction
The concept of utility-maximizing residents ultimately determining residential property tax rates goes back to as early as Tiebout (1956 ). Tiebout's seminal "voting with your feet model" relied on fully mobile consumers and dispensed with any political behavior. Fischel (2001) was the first to articulate the idea that homeowners who are voters ("homevoters") are special with respect to their interests towards desired local levels of public spending and property taxes, and that they articulate these interests in local political processes. According to this "home-voter hypothesis", the level of property taxation and other public financing decisions are ultimately driven by the desire of resident homeowners to maximize the values of their houses. Fischel's hypothesis has been tested in the context of numerous local public referenda, usually with corroborating results (see, e.g., Dehring, Depken II, and Ward, 2008; Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2015) .
Rather than focusing solely on homeowners, subsequent work has put stronger focus on the tastes and behavior of homeowners and renters. Particularly for the U.S., research suggests that the larger the share of households renting their homes in a jurisdiction, the higher the tendency of the local government to spend extensively on public services, the so-called "renter effect". Oates (2005) focuses on the potential mechanisms that lead renters to drive up local public expenditures in a jurisdiction. Consistent with early research by Roche (1986) , he finds that the positive association between rental share and public spending is due to renters' perception of public services being "not so costly", rather their higher demand for such services compared to homeowners. Fiscal illusion is thus a likely source of the renter effect. In the presence of a renter effect, any empirical model explaining property tax rate choice through spatial variation in homeownership must carefully control for the local level of public expenditure.
More recently, Brunner, Ross, and Simonsen (2015) discuss fiscal illusion as a possible explanation for the higher willingness of renters to support an increase in local property taxes to expand funding for public services. Using micro-level data of registered voters in California, they find that compared to renters, homeowners are 10-15% less likely to be in favor of a property tax rather than a sales tax increase. Their estimation strategy controls for individual preferences towards public spending. Contradictory to the fiscal illusion hypothesis, their result is not driven by the voting behavior of renters: while renters are indifferent to whether a property tax or sales tax increase is used to finance additional spending, it is the homeowners who strongly oppose a property tax increase relative to a sales tax increase. Importantly, the strong aversion against property tax increases is not associated with the relative tax burden faced by this group of residents.
As a potential explanation for this finding, Brunner, Ross, and Simonsen (2015) refer to the more salient nature of property taxes for homeowners. Cabral and Hoxby (2016) exploit variation in property tax escrow across locations in the U.S. in order to investigate in more detail to what extent the salience of the property tax for homeowners affects its level and acceptance. To study the effect of salience, they make use of the fact that about half of U.S. homeowners with mortgages pay their property taxes through tax escrow, a payment method that converts the usually highly visible property tax into an indirect, difficult-to-compute payment that is collected through automatic methods. Variation in the use of tax escrow generates variation in property tax salience over different jurisdictions and time that can be considered as random. Their findings indicate that areas where property taxes are less salient witness higher tax rates and lower likelihoods of tax revolts, which they use as an indication of tax popularity.
Existing studies on the policital economy of property taxation in the presence of home-voting and differences in tax salience between owners and renters fail to account for spatial dependence emanating from local governments' interactions in tax rate choice.
There is ample evidence that local property tax rates are at least partially driven by the observable choices of neighboring governments. The corresponding literature will be briefly reviewed in the following.
Among the first to use spatial econometric methods to investigate strategic property tax interaction are Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) . Spatial interaction is motivated in their paper by public tax competition in the presence of footloose, heterogeneous consumers and sorting. In order to trace out the property tax reaction function of the representative community, Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) estimate a spatial autoregressive model with data covering a sample of cities in the Boston metropolitan area. They find significant spatial lag parameters from 0.16 to 0.70, depending on the form of the spatial weighting matrix. 6 While these results are generally in line with tax competition, Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) note correctly that their findings are observationally 6 Obviously, a precise estimation is strongly limited by the small sample size that is used in that paper. 6 equivalent with the yardstick competition framework of Besley and Case (1995) . In this framework, resident voters are immobile and have homogeneous preferences but use information about tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions to judge whether their own local government is inefficient and deserves to be voted out of office. 7
Following the work of Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) , an increasing number of papers has examined spatial dependence in local property tax rates for different countries.
These papers usually estimate spatial dependence parameters of 0.4-0.6, equivalent with ten percentage point higher average property tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions leading to a 4-6 points higher tax rate in the jurisdiction considered (without accounting for any feedback effects). A key objective has been to better discriminate among tax and yardstick competition as possible sources of such dependence. Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003) show that local property tax rates are positively spatially autocorrelated among adjacent jurisdictions in Italy when the mayors run for reelection, while this correlation is absent either when mayors face a term limit or when backed by an overwhelming majority in the local council. This result clearly supports yardstick competition and tax mimicking as the relevant mechanism. Analyzing property tax choice interaction by Dutch municipalities, Allers and Elhorst (2005) corroborate this view, finding that interaction in property tax rates is less pronounced among municipalities governed by coalitions backed by large majorities. Fiva and Rattsø (2007) apply a spatial probit model to test whether the decision to have the residential property tax in local communities in Norway depends on the observable past decisions of adjacent localities. Their results also point towards yardstick competition as best predictor of existing geographic patterns in local property tax rates.
Two more recent studies deserve to be mentioned. Dubois and Paty (2010) use a panel of 104 local communities from 1989-2001 in order to test housing tax setting in France. They extend the analysis of yardstick competition by the impact of tax choices in locations which are not only geographically close but comparable in socioeconomic structure. Their results suggest that voters sanction incumbents when their own local housing tax is high relative to geographic neighbors, and reward them when cities similar in socioeconomic structure have high local taxes. Delgado, Lago-Penas, and Mayor (2011) use a large sample of 2,713 municipalities in Spain and find evidence of property tax mimicking with a spatial lag parameter of slightly over 0.4. Overall, the accumulated evidence strongly points towards the existence of systematic spatial dependence in property tax choices and yardstick competition as the main driver of this dependence. 8
A Simple Yardstick Competition Model
Yardstick competition in tax rates (Besley and Case, 1995) is based on informational externalities between jurisdictions. Voters make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome the political agency problem of asymmetric information about the true cost of providing local public services and the quality of local policymakers. This forces incumbent governments into yardstick competition, in which they have to account for other (neighboring) local governments' tax choices. We incorporate the political economy of homeowning versus renting into this framework by allowing for heterogeneity in voters' information sets and motivation to vote against high property taxes.
In order to finance public services, local governments within an economy of M autonomous but interdependent jurisdictions can tax property at a rate τ m per unit of local property tax base. The cost of providing public services per unit of tax base, φ m , is random 8 Some recent papers have advocated a quasi-experimental research design to identify strategic interaction in property tax setting. This line of research has argued that reduced-form spatial interaction models rely on comparatively strong assumptions that lead towards a tendency to overestimate the true amount of interaction. Lyytikäinen (2012) uses a reform of the statutory lower limits to property tax rates in Finland as a source of exogenous variation to estimate the response of municipalities to tax rates in neighboring communities. He finds no evidence of systematic interdependencies in property tax rates. Baskaran (2014) exploits a reform of the fiscal equalization scheme in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia, which exogenously caused local municipalities to increase their property and business tax rates, to identify tax mimicking by local governments in the neighboring state of Lower Saxony. While traditional spatial lag regressions suggest immediate strategic interactions, a difference-in-difference analysis also points towards insignificant interaction in tax rates. and specific to each municipality. This cost is known to local governments but unobserved by residents. The socially optimal level of spending per unit of tax base corresponding to local cost is g * m . Different from property tax rates, the local cost of providing public services cannot be controlled by policy makers. It is reasonable to assume that the local cost varies with exogenous jurisdictional characteristics, such as population size and sociodemographic composition (e.g., the proportion of residents seeking unemployment benefits or subsidies), as well as with revenues from other taxes and transfers from superordinate layers of federal government (Revelli, 2005) . Governments have to tax property more heavily if they face higher unit costs, such that in equilibrium it holds τ m = τ (φ m ) with dτm dφm > 0. This leads to our first testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 -Local Public Financing through Property Taxes: Higher spending needs and more constrained fiscal conditions in a jurisdiction go along with higher local property tax multipliers.
Residents obtain utility from public services consumption and earn disutility from being taxed. There can be two types of government: "good" governments provide public services at true cost, whereas "bad" governments engage in rent-seeking by increasing property taxes over costs and impropriating the surplus, s m = τ m − φ m . Resident voters can appraise incumbents' and discriminate "good" from "bad" governments only by comparing the property tax rate and public services in their own jurisdiction with observable neighboring jurisdictions' average tax rates and services, τ −m and g −m . Voters care about minimizing expected future taxes using present taxes and services to update their beliefs that the incumbent is good using Bayes' rule. With given observables, they vote "bad" incumbents out of office with probability p m = p(τ m , τ −m , g m , g −m ). 9 Information about public policies in neighboring municipalities thus help imperfectly informed voters to learn about the own local governments' public financing efficiency. Since incumbent governments aim at being reelected, they are forced to take neighboring jurisdictions' policies into account in their own tax rate choices. Besley and Case (1995) demonstrate that in equilibrium, a situation emerges where adjacent local jurisdictions strategically mimic each others' property tax rate choices, known as yardstick competition:
with dτm dφm , dτm dτ −m > 0. This leads to our second testable hypothesis: 10
Hypothesis 2 -Spatial Tax Mimicking: Local governments mimic each other in setting property tax multipliers: higher multipliers in neighboring jurisdictions go along with higher multipliers in the own municipality, and vice versa.
Information asymmetry between local councils and voters about the true costs of local public services provision lies at the heart of the yardstick competition framework.
In the homeowner-renter context, it is plausible to keep this core assumption and assume that such costs are fully known to the local councils but generally not observable by both homeowners and renters. The research reviewed in the previous chapter yet clearly suggests that it is reasonable to allow for heterogeneity with regard to the degree of information and behavior of these two different groups of residents, as homeowners have stronger incentives to closely monitor local governments' property tax choices than renters and the tax is generally more salient to them. This is expected to cause a greater willingness among homeowners to sanction bad governments in the presence of inefficiently high taxes. In this case, jurisdictional homeownership rates enter the probability-of-reelection function for bad governments 11 as additional arguments. To see this, note that the utility of bad governments in the yardstick competition game, V m , depends on the surplus they can appropriate from raising taxes over costs in the current period and, in case they get reelected, subsequent periods:
with marginal utility dvm dsm > 0 and marginal probability of reelection dpm dsm < 0. Equation (1) highlights the fundamental trade-off between higher utility from higher surpluses in the present period against the lower probability of being reelected for the subsequent period if being unmasked of being "bad". Now assume that homeowners, present in local populations with varying and exogenous shares of π m , always only reelect incumbents if they can expect them to be good, given the observable property tax setting decisions in their own jurisdiction relative to neighboring municipalities. Renters, present in local populations with shares of 1 − π m , can be of two different types: an exogenous fraction of γ (homogeneous among municipalities) is "careless" about the relative level of property taxes and reelects incumbents with an exogenous probability of p ex γ , whereas a fraction of 1 − γ is "informed" and follows the same probabilistic voting behavior as homeowners do. We lend to the notation of Revelli (2005) in writing the probability-of-reelection function among homeowners in this case as
and among renters as
The total probability-of-reelection function for municipality m becomes
which is a weighted average of the reelection probabilities among homeowners and renters.
For p ex γ > p(·), it holds that dpm dπm < 0, i.e. the reelection probability always decreases with higher local shares of homeowners irrespective of the level of γ. 12 If local governments maximize (1) with respect to s m and incumbents' probability of being reelected follows (4), the emerging tax reaction function includes both the local share of homeowners and the share of homeowners in neighboring jurisdictions as arguments:
Through decreasing the reelection probability in the case of being unmasked of "bad" behavior, a higher local homeownership rate unanimously decreases the property tax rate in the own municipality. This leads us to our third and key testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 -Homeowner Effect: Local property tax multipliers decrease with an increasing share of owner-occupied dwellings in a municipality.
Heterogeneity with regard to voting behavior between owners and renters in the context of local property taxation leads to another interesting implication: as property tax rates are complements in the yardstick competition game, the higher local governments set their own tax multipliers relative to neighbors, the higher the probability that homeowners (and informed renters) vote them out of office. Yardstick competition and tax mimicking among jurisdictions should therefore be particularly intense when homeownership rates in the region are generally higher than elsewhere, i.e. when there are many "watchdogs" in the populations of competing jurisdictions. This leads to a fourth and final testable hypothesis which supplements our key hypothesis on the homeowner effect:
Hypothesis 3 * -Regional Homeownership and Tax Competition: The intensity of spatial tax mimicking among local governments is stronger within regions of high-homeownership municipalities.
Data and Estimation Methodology

Data
Property Tax Multipliers. Like in many other countries, the German property tax is levied at the municipal level. The taxonomy of property taxation follows the same principles country-wide. The annual tax burden for a property j of type k in a municipality m can be calculated as follows:
where T AX denotes the tax payment, V AL ass the property-specific assessed value, RAT E a property-type-specific tax rate and M U LT the local tax multiplier.
Municipal autonomy in choosing the effective property tax rate is limited to setting the local tax multiplier M U LT m . The responsibility for setting this multiplier is with the municipal councils. The property-specific assessed values ("Einheitswerte") are fixed by the local tax offices based on a methodology using 1964 house prices for West Germany and 1935 prices for East Germany. 13 The property-type-specific tax rates are ruled by federal law and uniform across the country. 14 The local tax multiplier is hence the only component of the effective tax rate that can be directly influenced by local governments, while all other components are exogenous. 15
Local councils are generally allowed to alter the multiplier once in a calendar year.
Any change to the multiplier has to be disclosed to the public in the municipal register ("Gemeindeblatt" Fiscal Conditions. Local property tax rates critically depend on local fiscal conditions. If homeowners have different tastes with respect to levels of public spending or debt, these conditions in turn systematically differ with respect to the local share of homeownership (Oates, 2005) . In order to account for the possibly confounding role of fiscal circumstances, we include 2010 levels of local public spending and municipal debt (at the superordinate district level) per capita, as well as per capita revenues from local business tax and vertical transfers of federal income and sales tax for the same year. 18
We obtain this data from the Federal Statistical Office. We additionally control for the size of the local property tax base per capita, which can be considered exogenous to local governments because assessed values are completely uncoupled from market values and local housing stocks are extremely durable (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005) .
Further Controls. As socioeconomic controls, we include population size, squared population size, population density and multiple indicators of socioeconomic structure (2009 taxable income per capita, share of unemployed persons, share of population aged 10 years or younger and population aged 70 years or older). In order to account for heterogeneous political preferences as another potentially confounding variable, we also include local shares of valid votes for the three main German left-oriented parties 19 in the 2009 Federal elections. 20 We obtain all data from the Federal Statistical Office. We additionally include a set of dummy variables flagging municipalities with state or country borders and cities with 100,000 inhabitants or more. We finally include a set of dummy variables reflecting the state in which a certain municipality is located. As left-oriented parties we include the Social Democratic Party ("Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands", SPD), the Green Party ("Bündnis 90/Die Grünen") and the Socialist Party ("Die Linke"). 20 In the 2009 German Bundestag Election, every voter had two votes: one to directly elect a local candidate (who can but must not necessarily be associated with a party) and a second vote to elect a party for seats in the German Bundestag. We use only the party-related second votes. 21 Moran's I values are computed using the row-standardized 10-nearest-neighbor spatial weight matrix.
Estimation Strategy
We test our hypotheses within a spatial framework of property tax rate choice. We link local property tax multipliers to local homeownership rates, neighboring municipalities' multipliers and controls in a spatial autoregressive model allowing for heteroskedastic disturbances:
The dependent variable τ is an N × 1-vector of municipal property tax multipliers in 2011, measured in percent. The tax multiplier in each municipality is not influenced by the characteristics of this jurisdiction alone, but also by a weighted average of property tax multipliers in adjacent localities. The strength of this dependence is governed by the N -dimensional spatial weighting matrix W N and the size of the spatial lag parameter λ.
HOR is an N × 1-vector of municipal homeownership rates; X is an N × k + 1-matrix of fiscal and non-fiscal control variables, while β and Ψ pick up (vectors of) coefficients.
Spatial Weighting Matrix. The choice set to specify a spatial weighting matrix ranges from different forms of geographical contiguity to distance-based connectivity. In the contiguity case, the spatial weights are typically based on the common border criterion, which allocates equal weights to all geographical neighbors. In the distance case, the spatial weights can be based on geographic and/or socioeconomic distance (Fingleton and Le Gallo, 2008; Dubois and Paty, 2010) and decrease exponentially in size at an exogenously defined rate of distance decay. We base the choice of spatial weights on our theoretical model and refer to the concepts of contiguity and geographic distance rather than socioeconomic distance: first, geographic neighbors are most likely to experience similar shocks and therefore provide the most useful information on the size of innovation for neighboring jurisdictions' voters (Besley and Case, 1995) . Second, resident voters can most probably compare their own jurisdiction with others belonging to the same local me-dia market. 22 Our baseline matrix is a row-standardized, binary nearest-neighbor matrix that links all municipalities to their 10 closest neighbors. We check whether our results are sensitive to replacing this baseline matrix with a row-standardized inverse-physicaldistance matrix with a 50 kilometer-cutoff band as well as with less sparse nearest-neighbor matrices with 20 and 30 neighbors, respectively. 23
Unobserved Heterogeneity. A concern about estimating the spatial autoregressive model of Equation (7) with cross-sectional data is unobserved local heterogeneity.
Accounting extensively for observables cannot rule out that fixed effects in local tax multipliers that are correlated with local homeownership remain uncontrolled. Unfortunately, we lack historical data on all relevant variables at this fine-grained spatial level that would allow us to set up a panel data set. We instead resort to including spatial lags in the covariates along with the ordinary spatial lag in the property tax multiplier. The resulting spatial Durbin model (SDM) 24 is able to capture unobserved heterogeneity when the unobserved factors are spatially correlated (LeSage and Pace, 2010; Elhorst, 2010) . 25
Endogeneity. Our identification strategy faces a potential endogeneity issue for the homeownership rate: if unobserved shocks to local property tax multipliers provide homeowners with an incentive to migrate to lower-tax locations, this decreases an area's homeownership and increases its tax rate in the long run. Such reverse causality would generate correlation between homeownership rates and the disturbances. Drukker, Egger, 22 The use of socioeconomic indicators for the definition of weights would furthermore require to ensure their strict exogeneity, unless their endogeneity is explicitly considered in the model specification. 23 Revelli (2005) argues that if unobserved shocks hit adjacent jurisdictions similarly, there may still remain spatial autocorrelation in the disturbance process of a spatial lag model of tax rate choice. To rule out this possibility, we test the regressions residuals of all spatial models for remaining spatial dependence using Moran's I. We additionally estimate a so-called mixed-regressive spatial model, which contains both a spatial lag in the dependent variable and a spatially autocorrelated error term. The mixed-regressive spatial model can be written as: τ = λW τ + βHOR + XΨ + with = ρW ξ, ξ ∼ 0, σ 2 i I N . The results for this model, as well as further alternative specifications of the spatial lag model, are reported in Table IntA .1 in the Internet Appendix. 24 The spatial Durbin model can be written as: τ = λW τ + βHOR + γW HOR + XΨ + W XΩ + with ∼ 0, σ 2 m I N . 25 Only in the very special case that the dependent variable does not exhibit spatial dependence and there are no spatially dependent omitted variables correlated with the included covariates, OLS and SDMs will yield very similar parameter estimates.
and Prucha (2013) recently propose a generalized method-of-moments and instrumental variable estimation strategy for spatial autoregressive models with additional endogenous regressors, extending earlier work by Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999) . 26 We use their estimation strategy and consider variables as instruments that are strongly correlated with 2011 local homeownership rates but expectedly independent of unobserved shocks to local tax multipliers. Based on extensive data search and processing, we resort to two previously untapped historical measures: the share of local housing destroyed or severely damaged by allied warfare during the Second World War and historical local proportions of owner-occupied dwellings directly after the war. 27 We obtain data on both variables at the level of historical districts from a complete housing inventory compiled in the 1950
West German Housing Census. 28 We construct municipality-level data for both variables matching the contemporaneous boundaries of all Western German municipalities to the boundaries of historical districts using historical maps and GIS.
Both war-related housing damages and directly after-war homeownership rates are expected to be valid instruments, influencing contemporaneous local property tax multipliers only through the channel of having long-lasting effects on our causal variable of interest, contemporaneous homeownership. Allied warfare can be viewed as a natural experiment that changed German local homeownership rates markedly within the first two decades after the war (Wolf and Caruana-Galicia, 2015) . As described in detail by Voigtländer (2009) , war-induced damages to local housing stocks led to large-scale, publicly subsidized provision of rental housing in affected areas, especially from the year of 1950 onwards. 29 Importantly, this public funding came entirely from the superordinate 26 Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999) propose using the linearly independent columns of X, W X and W q X as instruments to solve the endogeneity problem between Y and W Y . 27 We experimented with local voter participation in the 2009 Bundestag elections as an additional instrument. Voter parcicipation is strongly (positively) correlated with homeownership, but probably not exogeneous to local property tax rates in equilibrium due to sorting effects. 28 The boundaries of 1950 districts usually comprise dozens of contemporaneous municipalities. 29 On Western German territory, about 2.25 million dwellings were destroyed, reducing the housing stock by nearly 20 percent in comparison to prewar levels. A further 2-2.5 million dwellings were damaged. Estimates suggest that in 1950, there was still a shortage of more than 4.5 million homes. This shortage was heavily reduced to an estimated shortfall of 660,000 dwellings in 1962, see Voigtländer (2009). state level. Municipal governments did not have to increase property taxation in order to finance rental housing provision.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows the distribution of war-related housing damage rates in 1950 at the level of historical districts. War damages mainly followed a west-east pattern which mimicked the direction of entry of Allied forces into Germany. High damage rates focused on towns and cities but extended to both urban and rural regions. Panel B
illustrates historical homeownership rates at the district level. The first-stage regression reveals that municipal homeownership rates today are still significantly lower in municipalities positioned in historical districts which suffered more war-related housing damages and had lower 1950 homeownership rates. 30
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5 Empirical Results All models are generally successful in explaining the variation in municipal property tax multipliers. In line with our main hypothesis, the local homeownership rate carries the expected negative sign and is throughout significant at the five percent level or better. 32
Estimation of Tax Multiplier Choice Model
The estimated coefficients for local homeownership turn out to be highly robust across the different specifications in terms of statistical and economic significance, as do the coefficients for fiscal and non-fiscal controls.
As indicated by the significant spatial parameters and large values of Moran's I for the OLS disturbances, OLS clearly fails to account for the spatial interaction processes governing property tax choice. Depending on the exact specification, the spatial lag parameter lies between 0.62 and 0.85 and is always strongly significant. These results do not hinge upon the concrete definition of the spatial weighting matrix: replacing nearest neighbors by inverse distance reduces the goodness of fit while only slightly changing the estimated coefficients for homeownership and the covariates. 33 Including spatially lagged covariates in the model remarkably improves fit but leaves most coefficients and also the spatial dependence parameter almost unchanged vis-à-vis the spatial lag model.
Almost all covariates capturing local fiscal conditions tend to be highly significant and carry plausible signs. Higher spending and debt levels per capita, reflecting higher financing needs, are associated with higher property tax multipliers. Higher local business tax revenues and vertical tax transfers per capita relax local governments' budget 32 We experimentally ran the same regressions with the percentage multiplier change between 2001-2011 as dependent variable instead of the level of multipliers. The local homeownership rate pertains its significantly negative effect on multipliers in this setting. 33 Increasing the number of neighbors from 10 to 20 or 30 also yields larger dependence parameters with otherwise very similar results.
constraints and go along with lower local property tax multipliers, ceteris paribus. The size of the property tax base is found to be insignificant in the majority of specifications.
Concerning the role of socioeconomic structure and political tastes in municipal property tax rate choice, the evidence is again in line with expectations, albeit some coefficients lack statistical significance. We find higher tax multipliers in larger and more densely populated municipalities (with decreasing margins in population), more unemployment, higher shares of elderly persons and more left-oriented political preferences.
Municipalities at state or federal borders tend to charge higher multipliers, whereas we do not find any separate effect for localities with populations of 100,000 or more. 34
The coefficients estimated on our main variable of interest are always statistically significant and negative, ranging between -0.199 in the OLS specification to -0.284 for the first-round (or direct) effect in the spatial IV specification. While caution is warranted for comparisons of coefficients estimated in linear non-spatial versus simultaneous spatial models, the evidence clearly shows that higher shares of homeowners in local populations are indeed associated with systematically lower property tax levels. This key result remains unchanged when an instrumental variable estimation is carried out based on teasing out exogenous variation in the contemporaneous homeownership rate based on variation in war-related housing damages and long-lagged homeownership rates at the superordinate historical district level. This indicates that the correlation that we observe in the data indeed lends itself to a causal interpretation.
Concerning economic significance, we first refer to the direct effect of a change in the homeownership rate on the tax multiplier in a certain municipality. Shutting down any indirect effects of tax changes emanating from multi-channel feedback playing out through the system of spatially interdependent jurisdictions, a ten percentage point rise in the local homeownership would on average reduce the local property tax multiplier by 2-3 percentage points. For a typical single-family house worth 80,000 euros of assessed value, this direct effect would be equivalent to a roughly one percent decrease in the annual tax burden, evaluated at the sample mean multiplier of 340 points. While this is a small economic effect at the level of the individual house, it is important to remember that municipalities typically consist of several hundreds or even thousands of homes.
Due to the strong spatial dependence in municipal property tax multipliers, the estimated direct effect of a change in homeownership in some municipality does not capture the total effect of this change on property tax multipliers. As adjacent jurisdictions react to the resulting change in their neighboring municipality's multiplier with altering their own multiplier, so will do their neighbors, and so on. The steady-state equilibrium size of these indirect effects depends on the size of the spatial dependence parameter and the shape of the spatial weighting matrix. 35 Following the "total effect to an observation" viewpoint pioneered by LeSage and Page (2009), we calculate the average total impact on the tax multiplier of a locality m from a global ten percentage point rise in local homeownership shares across the entire sample. 36 In the spatial autoregressive model with 10 nearest neighbors, the average total effect is -5.6, more than twice as much as the average direct effect of -2.1. Using the estimates from the 10-nearest-neighbors spatial Durbin model, the total effect even amounts to -7.1. 37 The resulting reduction in local multipliers of 6-7 points would correspond to an annual loss of 120-140 million euros, or one percent of total property tax revenue across all municipalities in the sample.
35 See LeSage and Page (2009) for a formal exposition of average direct, indirect and total effects. 36 The actual homeownership rate exceeded 90 percent in 111 communities in 2011 (1.4 percent of the sample). The resulting error can be considered negligible. 37 Compared to the direct effect, this is a disproportional increase vis-à-vis the spatial autoregressive model that can be explained by the larger estimate for the spatial lag parameter.
Discriminating among Tax Incidence and Tax Salience as
Possible Channels
A natural question is whether the key result of a homeowner effect in local property taxes is driven by differences in tax incidence or tax salience between homeowners and renters.
The design of the German property tax certainly renders salience higher for homeowners than for renters. Regarding incidence, homeowners bear the full property tax burden irrespective of local market conditions. For rental housing, incidence depends on the relative local price elasticities of housing demand and supply. In "loose" markets where demand for rental housing is considerably price elastic, the main portion of property tax burdens in economic terms will remain with landlords. Renters are expected to bear the main portion in "tight", strong housing demand markets. Since every household is expected to fully bear the tax, the partition of local housing into owner-occupied and rental should play less a role for property taxes in the latter case. If local price elasticities do not play a role, differences in salience are likely to be the main driver of our key result.
Discriminating among municipalities of high and low housing demand elasticities is a challenging task. As a proxy of the relative local bargaining power between landlords and tenants, we resort to the fraction of rental housing standing vacant in each municipality. 38
It is plausible to assume that tenants' bargaining power and price elasticity of demand increase with higher local rental vacancy. This conjecture is strongly supported by a regression of the cumulative local growth in apartment rents from 2004-2011 on the 2011 local rate of vacancy and state fixed effects: on average, each additional percentage point of vacancy in local rental housing was associated with 8 percentage points less cumulative rent growth at the level of districts. 39
In order to test the proposition of a deviating homeowner effect, we interact local homeownership rates with two mutually exclusive dummy variables, flagging municipalities in the highest quartile of the rental vacancy distribution ("loose areas", high va-cancy=1 and 0 otherwise) and the lower three quartiles of the same distribution ("tight areas", low vacancy=1 and 0 otherwise). Since the distribution of rental vacancies is strongly right-skewed, we conservatively split the sample at the 75 th percentile rather than the median. This ensures we only have true excess-housing jurisdictions in the high-vacancy group. 40
If differences in tax incidence drive our main result, we would expect homeownership rates to depress property tax multipliers less strongly in jurisdictions with low rental vacancies (low price elasticity of housing demand). However, Table 3 shows that the homeownership coefficients for the two subsamples of high-vs. low-vacancy municipalities are always very close to one another, regardless of the specification considered. 41
In fact, the null hypothesis that the two coefficients be equal can never be rejected at common significance levels. Our key result thus holds regardlessly of the actual incidence of property taxes, which supports the view that a higher salience of the property tax for homeowners is likely to be the decisive mechanism that is driving our key result.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Differences in Intensity of Property Tax Mimicking between
High-and Low-Homeownership Regions
If home-voters act as "watchdogs" over the efficiency of property taxation by local incumbents, not only are property tax rates influenced by the level of homeownership in each 40 See Figure A.2 municipality, but the intensity of spatial interaction in local governments' tax rate choices is expected to be larger within regions featuring high homeownership rates in general.
In order to test this proposition empirically, we split our sample into two subsamples reflecting different levels of regional homeownership rates. We first cluster the whole sample of municipalities into the 72 official Western German planning regions, which are delineated based on commuting patterns and can be interpreted as regional labor markets (Lerbs and Oberst, 2014) . We then compute the unweighted average homeownership rates of municipalities belonging to each region and finally group municipality-regions according to the average rate. Since the planning regions differ in size and comprise different numbers of municipalities, this procedure is not equivalent to just splitting the sample at the median homeownership rate. In contrast, our procedure ensures that jurisdictions within functional regions are grouped together instead of jurisdictions spread all over the country.
The sample of municipalities in high-homeownership regions consists of 4,171 jurisdictions, while in low-homeownership regions, we arrive at a number of 3,865. The mean local homeownership rate is 72.8 percent in the "high" sample versus 62.8 percent in the "low" sample. 42 We construct different spatial weighting matrices individually for the two subsamples using the same definitions of geographical adjacency as before and estimate the familiar spatial models. The results are shown in Table 4 . Our results are perfectly in line with the theoretical prediction: for each specification, the estimated spatial dependence in property tax multipliers is considerably larger within the group of high-homeownership regions. 43 The absolute difference is largest for the spatial lag model estimated using the inverse distance matrix, where the estimated spatial lag parameter is 0.97 for the high-homeownership subsample and 0.65 for the low-homeownership subsample. We hence conclude that in addition to a significant effect of more homeownership 42 With 62.8 percent, the mean local homeownership rate in the "low" sample is still considerably high. In this sense, the split can be considered very conservative. The underlying reason is that aggregate homeownership rates at the level of planning regions are relatively homogeneous. 43 Full regression results for the split regressions for high-versus low-homeownership regions are reported in Tables IntA.4 and IntA.5 in the Internet Appendix.
within a particular municipality, higher homeownership rates in the region tend to be associated with stronger property tax mimicking by local governments in that region.
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Conclusion
In efficient property markets, contract arrangements governing the partition of property rights in local housing do not make any difference to how strongly housing is taxed. A growing body of evidence suggests, however, that homeowners oppose property taxation much more than renters. Homeowners have strong economic incentives to shield their housing wealth against taxation, as they bear the full burden of the property tax independent of local market conditions. They typically also face a stronger tax salience than renters. This makes a case for the political economy of property taxation.
Based on data for over 8,000 German local jurisdictions, this paper has presented representative and large-scale empirical evidence in favor of an economically meaningful home-voter effect in local property taxation: property is taxed less heavily in jurisdictions with higher proportions of owner-occupied housing. Based on estimates derived from spatial econometric models that account for spatial dependence in municipal tax multipliers and endogeneity in homeownership, we are able to compute the average total effect from a hypothetical change in homeownership rates on property tax revenue. We estimate that local tax multipliers would on average be 6-7 points lower if the homeownership rate was ten percentage points higher across all 8,036 municipalities in our sample. Such a reduction in local multipliers would correspond to an annual 120-140 million euros or one percent loss of total tax revenue. This effect withstands the inclusion of a battery of potentially confounding factors, the consideration of spatial dependence and the correction for bias arising from endogeneity of homeownership levels.
Interacting municipal homeownership rates with an indicator of rental housing de-mand elasticity -the local non-single family housing rate of vacancy -suggests that our key result even holds in "tight" housing markets, i.e. even when tenants are expected to bear very similar property tax burdens in economic terms as their fellow owner-occupying neighbors. We interpret this as evidence that the home-voter effect originates from differences in salience of the property tax between owner-occupiers and renters rather than from differences in tax incidence. This interpretation is in line with recent findings by Cabral and Hoxby (2016) and Brunner, Ross, and Simonsen (2015) using U.S. data. We finally show that spatial tax mimicking among jurisdictions is stronger within regions comprising high-homeownership-rate municipalities, suggesting that governments not only set lower local tax rates but also care more intensively about the tax choices of their neighbors when homeowning residents force them to do so.
Our results have at least two important practical implications. First, they provide local governments with evidence enabling them to benchmark their actual tax rate choices against other structurally comparable local jurisdictions. Second, our finding of a homevoter effect in property taxation indicates that actual property tax levels may not be efficient in terms of overall social welfare: if homeowners successfully manage to oppose high property tax rates, property taxation will tend to be systematically too low in homeowner communities, whereas other local fees and taxes will tend to be too high. Such second-round effects, while not investigated in this paper, potentially affect the equity of local access to public and quasi-public goods. Examining the question of whether local governments attempt to compensate lower property tax revenues resulting from higher local political power of homeowners by charging higher fees and non-property taxes is a fruitful avenue of future research. 
Figure A.2: Empirical Frequency Distribution of Non-Single Family Housing Vacancy
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